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ABSTRACT  
This paper is the result of a study on temp agency workers and on the role that temp agency work 
played in company’s staffing strategies and on industry and national regulations regarding temp 
agencies and temp agency work. It was conducted in2004-2006, as part of a larger project on low 
wage work in the Netherlands, which was part of a five country study for the Russell Sage 
Foundation, USA. In order to provide a background for understanding temporary agency work, 
recent developments in and the various forms of external numerical flexibility in the Netherlands 
are sketched first. The temporary agency market apparently is well equipped to provide services for 
firms’ demands for flexible labor. The largest volume of temp work through agencies includes rather 
low-skilled jobs for manufacturing, transport, cleaning and administrative work, although most large 
temp work agencies also maintain specialized departments for outsourcing nurses, secretaries, 
managers, and other professional medical or technical staff. If one relates the 2004 figures to the 
Dutch dependent workforce at large, temp agency workers made up 6.0 percent (head-count) of 
that workforce, and 4.5 percent in FTEs. In firms using temp agency workers, on average 7 percent 
of the workforce recently was made up of temp agency workers. Major motives for companies to 
hire temp agency workers are peaks in production, mostly predictable peaks, as well as replacement 
of staff falling ill. 
As for the regulatory regime, in the late 1990s, two species of legislation were introduced that are 
of relevance here. The Flexibility and Security (‘Flexicurity’) Act of 1999, replacing the 1965 law, is 
most important for the regulation of employment relationships in and by temp work agencies. The 
1998 WAADI Act regulates the temp agency product market, and abolished the former license 
system, although the government kept the option open to reinstate such a system ‘in the interest of 
good relations on the labour market or the interests of the personell concerned’. For temp work 
agencies the main implication of the new law was that agreements between them and employees 
were to be employment contracts. As temp work agencies are assumed to bear employer 
responsibility, this may lead to larger security for temp agency workers. Temp agency workers are 
for the larger part covered by a collective agreement, concluded by General Federation Temporary 
Work Agencies - ABU with the major trade unions. After mandatory extension, about 94 percent of 
the temp agency workers were covered by an agreement. 
For typologies of temp agency workers on employment status and education we have analysed the 
2004 data of the WageIndicator, collected via a web-based survey addressing the labor force in the 
Netherlands. The analyses show that 1.7 percent of the observations concerned a temp agency 
worker. Of this group, one out of ten indicated to be a school pupil or student. Another five 
percent was a housewife/man with a job on the side, partly disabled, unemployed, or working 
without loss of unemployment benefits. Temp agency work is often associated with people with a 
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weak position in the labour market, but it appeared that temp agency workers did not significantly 
differ from other workers with regard to their years of education, although they more often had 
enjoyed general education instead of vocational education. Temp agency workers are typically young 
workers, as they proved to be relatively younger than the workforce of any other large branch of 
industry. Compared with their share in the total Dutch workforce, migrant workers, from western 
or from non-western origin, are comparatively more often employed via temp work agencies.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) in the United States had developed plans to support a 
cross-national comparison of the quality of low-wage employment in Europe and the United States. 
Having completed an extensive series of case studies of such jobs in the US in partnership with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, RSF then seeked to commission a set of comparable case studies for five 
European countries: Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The 
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour  Studies (AIAS) of the University of Amsterdam and STZ 
advies & onderzoek (consultancy & research) in Eindhoven were chosen to undertake the study for 
the Netherlands. The focus was on six occupations that were low-wage occupations in the USA, 
notably the housekeeper/cleaner, the sales clerk/cashier, the call center agent, the temp agency 
worker, the food production worker, and the nursing assistant. Given the nature of the study, 
notably case studies in eight establishments in five industries, it was clear that temp agency workers 
are not working in the temp work agencies as such, but that their workplaces could be found in 
other industries. Therefore, the study of temp agency workers had a greater focus on the role that 
temp agency work played in company’s staffing strategies and on industry and national regulations 
regarding temp agencies and temp agency work. This working paper is the result of this study. The 
full report of the study on low wage work in the Netherlands will be published in the USA by 2008. 
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2.  NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 
2.1  INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY 
In order to provide a background for the following chapters on temporary agency work, we will 
treat in this first chapter the recent developments in and the various forms of external numerical 
flexibility in the Netherlands, as temp agency work is one of these forms. We will go into the 
relationship with internal numerical flexibility.  
 
Since the mid-1960s, opening / production hours and working hours tend to fall apart. The rise of 
just-in-time production and delivery patterns on the one hand and changing demographic patterns 
and shorter working weeks on the other pushed firms towards flexibility. For the time being, 
numerical flexibility seems to dominate in the Netherlands over the other option, functional 
flexibility – if those cases are counted in which the latter option is structured and embedded in the 
organisation.1 A variety of firm strategies aiming at internal numerical flexibility emerged: 
•  flexible working hours, notably variability in hours over the working day (away from the ‘9 to 5’ 
pattern) and flexibility in hours per week2; 
•  annualisation of working hours, with flexible schedules over the year3; 
•  overtime hours, most frequently found among drivers, commercial employees, and various 
groups of professionals4; 
•  working non-regular hours, in weekends or at night, most frequently found in agriculture, health 
care and public transport5; 
•  ‘time bank’ systems, aiming at workers’ opportunities to ‘trade’ days against other elements in 
collective labour agreements (CLAs)6 and developing into the so-called a la carte CLAs7; 
•  internal labour pools8; 
•  secondment (detachering) in the own firm; 




                                                  
   As such, we do not regard part-time work as a form of internal numerical flexibility, although from the employers’ perspective some 
arguments are in favour of linking part-time with flexibility (Oeij et al, 2002, 23). 
1   Van Klaveren et al, 1997; Fouarge et al, 2002. 
2   Tijdens, 1998, 32, 48-9. 
3   Tijdens & Van der Meer, 2000. 
4   Tijdens, 1998, 41-2. 
5   Tijdens, 1998, 44-5. 
6   Tijdens, 1998, 49-50. 
7   Korteweg et al, 2003. 
8   Tijdens, 1998, 67-8. 
9
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With a time lag of about a decade, external numerical flexibility strategies10 of Dutch firms became 
visible too. They showed up in a number of variations11: 
•  temporary agency work; 
•  external labour pools (like already existing in the Rotterdam and Amsterdam ports and in road 
transport); 
•  fixed-term contracts; 
•  work on call, working with substitutes12; 
•  homework; 
•  insourcing and outsourcing; 
•  secondment (detachering) in/to other firms; 
•  hiring self-employed and freelancers.  
 
For many reasons the issue is complicated, for example as from an employers’ perspective internal 
and external flexibility often mix up.  Most of these forms can be called contractual flexibility: temp 
agency work, fixed-term contracts, work on call, labour pools, and homework. The other forms 
concern the internalising or externalising of knowledge and/or workers: insourcing or outsourcing, 





2.2  EXTERNAL NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY 
Statistics Netherlands registers yearly figures pointing at external numerical flexibility (reference 
date: December 31). These figures show that in 2005 just over half a million Dutch wage earners, 
8.5 percent of the countries’ dependent workforce, fell under this definition. They are divided into 
temp agency workers, workers on call and substitutes (the latter two separated until 2001), and 
other flexible workers. One may assume that the large majority of workers counted in the last 
category had fixed-term contracts. Although external labour pools have expanded in the last decade 
in the Netherlands, the total number of workers involved may not exceed 50,000.15 Homeworkers 
included in the flexible worker category will mainly be those in ‘classical’ low-skilled, low wage jobs 
                                                  
10   It may be questioned whether conscious strategies are dominating here, or rather processes of trial and error or ‘emergent strategies’, like 
De Leede & Van Riemsdijk (2000) show for the Dutch automotive industry. See for criticism on the supposed strategic managerial behaviour 
concerning labour flexibility a.o. Pollert, 1991. 
11   De Haan et al, 1994; Tijdens, 1998; Goudswaard et al, 2000; Moolenaar, 2002. 
12   Tijdens (1998, 65-6) groups work on call (in Dutch: afroeparbeid) under internal numerical flexibility, as employer and employee have a 
labour contract, be it without arrangements concerning definite numbers of hours. 
13   Oeij et al, 2002. 
14   Remery et al, 1999; Fouarge et al, 2002. 
15   The last official figure for labour pools (code 74504) was for 1999: 42,400 employed (CBS, Statline). 
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in manufacturing; we expect that ‘modern’ teleworkers have been left out. By 2000 the number of 
classical homeworkers in the Netherlands was estimated to amount to 30 – 35,000.16
 
Secondment as well as hiring self-employed and freelancers will be more widespread, but these 
practices are hardly covered by official statistics. The same holds true for outsourcing, a practice in 
which activities that are no longer defined to belong to the firm’s core business are put outside the 
firm. This practice has, especially in value chains in manufacturing industry, grown rapidly in the 
preceding years, and gave rise to on the one hand ‘hollow companies’ and on the other hand to 
mature supply structures including large suppliers of cleaning, IT, HRM activities and other (shared) 
services17. Recently some companies returned on earlier decisions concerning outsourcing and 
changed to insourcing the activities at stake. In statistical terms, however, insourcing and 
outsourcing are quite fluid practices and the numbers of workers involved can hardly be traced. 
 
Following Statistics Netherlands data, the share of flexible workers in the dependent workforce 
rose quickly from 1992 to 1996, from 7.6 to nearly 10 percent (excl. workers working less than 12 
hours a week). Other sources show the same tendency.18 The growth of temp agency work 
accounted for 70 percent of this growth: the share of temp work in the total workforce grew from 
1.9 percent in 1992 to 3.4 percent in 1996. The share of workers on call grew also, from 1.5 
percent of all wage earners (1992) to 2.0 percent (1996), but at the same time the share of 
substitute workers fell down from 0.7 to 0.6 percent.19 We continue this information in Table 120 
for 1996 – 2005. As other research has proven that flexibility varies widely among men and 
women21, we offer both total figures and figures divided by gender. According to Statistics 
Netherlands the share of flexible workers working 12 hours per week and more reached its peak 
with 10.4 percent of in 1998, fell gradually to a low of 7.4 percent in 2003, and then grew again 
modestly. The development of temp agency work was about the same, but the numbers of temp 








                                                  
16   Van Klaveren & Van de Westelaken, 2000. 
17   Van Halem et al, 2002. As is illustrated in this report, the maturity of labour relations is often lagging behind in new networks or 
configurations of economic activity. See on this issue also the industry report on the Dutch Call Centre industry. 
18   Remery et al, 1999, 39. 
19   Oeij et al, 2002, 29. 
20   Included are those without permanent contract and/or with whom no fixed working hours have been agreed upon; excluded are those 
with a working week less than 12 hours. 
21   Goudswaard, 2003, 137-8. 
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2.3  EXPLAINING EXTERNAL NUMERICAL FLEXIBILITY 
We suppose that risk-avoiding employer behaviour can serve as a major explanation for the 
magnitude of external numerical flexibility.22 In the recession of the early 1990s and quite some 
years thereafter, many employers avoided offering workers permanent contracts as much as they 
could. New legislation affecting the costs of sickness and occupational hazards strengthened this 
behaviour23. The new Law on Continuous Wage Payments to workers in case of sickness (WULBZ, 
1996, the virtual abolition of the former Sickness Leave Act or Ziektewet), major changes in the cost 
structure of the Occupational Disablement Act (Wet Pemba, 1998), and the new Law on the 
Reintegration of Handicapped Persons (Wet Rea, 1998), all enlarged the risks of having workers of 
the firms’ own payroll and made deploying temp agency workers comparatively cheaper.24  
 
Moreover, the Flexibility and Security (‘Flexicurity’) Act (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) of 1999 limited 
the time of probation for regular staff to two months, with a compulsory agreement in writing. Yet, 
the new law did not straightforwardly promote external flexibilisation: in trying to unite ‘flexibility’ 
with ‘security’ it included stricter rules concerning temp agency work, discouraged ‘min-max 
contracts’ and ‘zero-hours contracts’, and created rights for temp agency workers to obtain 
permanent jobs. Hoever, it also increased flexibility for the temp agencies, because the maximum 
hiring duration for 1,000 hours for one temp agency worker was released. An evaluation of the 
Flexicurity Act showed that this law and the related new ABU CLA led to higher costs for both 
temp agencies and user firms.25 Other research argues that temp agency workers are still less costly 
than own staff, but that this cost advantage has a rather limited duration.26 And, to put things in 
perspective: in most EU member states the share of flexible contracts stabilized in the second half of 
the 1990s, irrespective of their institutions.27
 
Other institutional factors may play a role too, and may stimulate employers to consider external 
flexibilisation options comparatively early.28 Variety in labour cost levels between internal and 
external options may be important. In the Netherlands already in 2000 nearly all forms of internal 
and external flexibility were in various ways covered by CLAs, and although such regulation proved 
                                                  
22   Cross-country analyses along the dimension of employment protection (EP) have been rather common, supposing that a high EP coincides 
with a high rate of flexible employment (cf. Dunnewijk, 2000, 2001). We do not follow this road especially as the Netherlands, after the changes in 
the legal framework, of 1998-99 are an extremely complicated case in this respect. 
23   Also suggested by Oeij et al, 2002, 31, fn. 15. 
24   Zijl et al, 2003. 
25   Van den Toren et al, 2002. Zijl et al (2003, 27) confirmed this conclusion. 
26   IBM, 2003, cited in Zijl et al, 2003, 11. 
27   Goudswaard & Andries, 2002. Compared with the other countries participating in the RSF Low Wage in Europe project, the Dutch figures 
concerning the share of all temp workers in the workforce are in the upper middle range: based on 2000 statistics, they appeared to be lower than in 
France, about equal than those in Germany, but considerably higher than the Danish and especially the UK figures (Martin & Stancanelli, 2002, 
based on OECD database on temporary work).  
28   Miedema & Klein Hesselink, 2002. 
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to be rather flexible,29 certain internal numerical flexibility measures remain rather expensive for 
Dutch employers. For example, in many CLAs substantial compensations for working ‘unsocial’ 
hours are laid down, while experience learns that the flexibility that such measures can create is 
rather limited: regarding overtime, for example, 1 – 2 percent of total staffing capacity.30 On the 
other hand, cost considerations may not have unambiguous outcomes and vary with market 
segments. Firms with high quality production and a high skilled workforce will preferably retain 
current staff in slack times as much as possible and be aware of the high transaction costs of most 
forms of external flexibilisation. Yet, outsourcing may be a viable option for this category, also 
because structured tender procedures may bring down transaction costs in the long run.31  
 
Table 1 shows that temp agency work and work on call/by substitutes lost shares compared to 
‘other flexibility’, in the early 2000s both for men and women, although afterwards temp agency 
work for men grew quicker than that for women. In the male flexible workforce, temp agency 
workers represented 37 percent (2003) to 46 percent (1998) of all flexible workers; their 2005 
share was 39 percent. In the female flexible workforce, temp agency workers had a somewhat lower 
share, varying from 33 percent in 2002 to an even lower share of 26 percent in the years 2003-
2005. 
 
From 1996 to 2002 numerical flexibility at large turned out to be more cyclical for females than for 
males, but this difference has diminished in the last three years. One might have expected that the 
recent wave of legal changes concerning occupational disabled (like Wet Verbetering Poortwachter or 
the Gatekeeper Improvement Act (2002), new Law on Occupational Disablement (2006, WIA)) 
would again have led to the growth risk-avoiding behaviour of employers. Indeed, current figures 
about numerical flexibilisation point to an upward trend, but on a considerably lower level than in 
the former (early) boom. A certain habituation to frequent governmental policy changes may well 
play a role, although the RSF case studies undertaken in the hotel industry show that this is certainly 
not everywhere at hand.  
 
According to official statistics, the occurrence of numerical flexibility varies widely across Dutch 
industries. The OSA Panel found that in Autumn 2003 nearly half of all work organisations used 
fixed-term contracts. Above this average scored transport, health care, public service, and 
education.32 Returning to the Statistics Netherlands figures, we found the highest total share of 
flexible workers for 2004 in the hotel and catering industry (30.9 percent), followed by another 
                                                  
29   Cf. Tijdens & Van der Meer, 2000. 
30   Tijdens, 1998, 62. 
31   Cf. Van Halem et al, 2002. 
32   Bekker et al, 2005, 65-6. 
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target industry of the RSF project, retail (30.1 percent). With 22.7 percent, the cleaning industry 
also showed a high score. The share of flexible work in the food industry was 8.1 percent, still twice 
that of manufacturing at large (4.1 percent). Hospitals showed 3.3 percent flexible workers, less than 
half than the share found for nursing and senior citizen’s homes (7.9 percent).33  
 
Across countries and industries the composition of the ‘external flexible workforce’, notably the 
share of temp agency work, may vary as well. In an international comparison temp agency work as 
an institutionalized form of temp work is much more rooted in the Netherlands than in other 
European countries, including the other four countries of the RSF research project. The Dutch 
market for temp agency work can be egarded as most mature.34 Compare for example with 
Germany, with an about equal total share of temp work in the workforce but a substantially lower 
share of temp agency work.35 As such, the development of the regulation of temp agency work does 
not provide a satisfying explanation for these differences. Obviously, other institutional 
arrangements play a larger role, like the availability of alternative opportunities of recruitment and of 
screening potential workers for permanent contracts (for example apprenticeships in Germany).36 
Of course, important factors are also the structures of the various national economies, the actual 
stage of the business cycle, and the related mix of motives for hiring agency workers. In section 3.7 
we will return on the shares of temp agency work in flexible contracts per industry. 
                                                  
33   CBS, Statline. 
34   Dunnewijk, 2000, 68. 
35   Moolenaar, 2002; Weinkopf, 2005. 
36   Dunnewijk, 2000, 71. 
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3.  THE TEMPORARY AGENCY MARKET IN THE NETHERLANDS 
3.1  CORE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
According to the European standard industry classification NACE, the temp agency companies are 
assigned NACE codes 7450. In the Netherlands, this code is further detailed. Companies under 
code 74501 undertake as a rule the mediation of temp agency workers, mediating staff temporarily 
to third parties while this staff is on their payroll. The workers concerned, although paid by the 
temp agency, do not have an employment relationship with the agency but with the user firm. The 
numbers of temp agency workers counted under this code largely co-incide with those under phase 
A in the Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) for temp work agencies (see sections 4.1. and 4.4.). 
Companies under code 74502 lease staff with which they maintain an employment relationship to 
other companies, via labour pools, secondment constructions or labour reserves for user firms. 
Statistics Netherlands states that the workers counted under this code co-incide with those under 
phases B and C in the temp agency worker CLAs.37
 
The largest volume of temp work through agencies includes rather low-skilled jobs for 
manufacturing, transport, cleaning and administrative work (see Table 2), although most large temp 
work agencies also maintain specialized departments for outsourcing nurses, secretaries, managers, 
and other professional medical or technical staff – activities deployed by specialized agencies too. 
For 2005, the total Dutch temp work agencies’ market was estimated roughly to amount to € 7 
billion, divided in: 44 percent mediation of administrative workers (€ 3,100 million), 43 percent of 
workers in manufacturing (€ 3,100 million), 10 percent in technical professions (€ 700 million) and 3 
percent in medical professions (€ 210 million).38
 
  
3.2  TRENDS IN GROWTH RATES 
In contrast to the workforce of other industries, it is difficult to estimate the size of the Dutch temp 
agency workforce. The volume of temp agency work can be expressed in either total days or total 
hours worked by the temp agency workers during a given period in time. Subsequently, the full-time 
equivalents (FTEs) of the temp agency workforce can be estimated. The volume can also be 
expressed as the number of temp agency workers in a given period, and subsequently as the share 
of temp agency work in the total Dutch workforce. Here, the volume of temp agency work will be 
dealt with. Chapter 5 reviews the composition of the temp agency workforce in greater detail. 
 
                                                  
37   CBS, De CBS statistiek van de uitzendbranche, January 2005 (leaflet). 
38   ABU, Flex & Figures, March 2006. 
AIAS – UvA    15 Kea Tijdens, Maarten van Klaveren, Hester Houwing, Marc van der Meer and  Marieke van Essen   
Since 1973, Statistics Netherlands has published data on the average number of agency workers per 
day, showing an increasing number of temp workers over a longer period of time with setbacks 
during recessions. As an illustration, during 1973-79 the market grew with 17 percent annually, but 
fell with 13 percent yearly in the heavy recession of 1980-83.39 The available evidence supports 
statistical analyses40 concluding that the demand for agency workers is highly affected by the 
economic cycle: it is higher in the first stages of an economic boom as well as in the last stages of a 
slump. Regression analysis based on 1986-1999 data shows that agency work is a leading indicator of 
investments (but not of unemployment).41
 
After almost five years of constant decline, temp agency (code 74501) sales increased in the third 
quarter of 2004 with 4 percent-points, followed by a fall of 1 percent-point in the last quarter but 
then again by a growth of respectively 6, 5 and 3 percent-points (corrected for seasonal influences) 
in the first, second and third quarters of 2005.42 In 2005, sales in mediation of administrative and 
technical professions grew most (19 percent, compared to 2 and 19 percent in 2004 respectively), 
followed by mediation for workers in manufacturing (plus 7 percent, against 5 percent in 2004). 
Mediation of medical staff remained at the same level, although this was an improvement compared 
to sales diminishing with 28 percent in 2004.43
 
The longer-term development of temp agency work employment, notably in FTEs, is hard to 
reconstruct as Statistics Netherlands changed statistical criteria in 2000. Comparable figures can 
only be given for the years 2001-04 (Table 3). If one relates the 2004 figures to the Dutch 
dependent workforce at large, temp agency workers made up 6.0 percent (head-count) of that 
workforce44, and 4.5 percent in FTEs.45 In firms using temp agency workers, on average 7 percent of 
the workforce recently was made up of temp agency workers.46
 
 
                                                  
39   Moolenaar, 2002; Dunnewijk, 2001. 
40   Zijl et al, 2003. 
41   Moolenaar, 2002, 42. 
42   CBS, Statline. 
43   ABU, Flex & Figures, March 2006. Figures of the ABU Monitor, relating to about 65 percent of the market as counted by Statistics 
Netherlands. 
44   This share was 5.7 percent if we leave out staff of temp work agencies (basis: CBS, Statline); Statistics Netherlands only publishes their 
employment in head-count figures. 
45   ABU, Flex & Figures, March 2006. 
46   Berkhout & Van Leeuwen, 2004. 
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3.3  SIZE DISTRIBUTION AND OWNERSHIP OF TEMP WORK AGENCY COMPANIES 
Six large, internationally operating companies have obtained a strong position in the Dutch market 
for temp agency work. By far the largest market share, about 35 percent47, has Randstad Group, of 
Dutch origin and currently ranking fourth worldwide. Second comes the United Services Group 
(USG People), a merger between Start48 and Unique whereby both continued to operate under 
their own name, followed by no. three: Adecco (Swiss-based, world business leader), no. four: 
Vedior (French, world’s second largest), no. five: Manpower (US, world’s number three), and no. six: 
Content (owned by the Belgian Solvus Group). Vedior and Content also have Dutch roots. In recent 
years, the foreign secondment agencies Kelly Services (US) and Brunel (UK) gained a solid position 
in the Netherlands.  
 
The large temporary agency companies have selling points in all Dutch towns. These selling points 
tend to cluster in or near shopping centres, as clothing and shoe stores do. The numbers of temp 
agency selling points (establishments) highly exceed those of temp agency companies, as the few 
large firms own considerable numbers of selling points. In November 2005, Randstad had 315 selling 
points in the Netherlands, USG People about 300 (Unique 100, Start 200), Adecco over 170, Vedior 
350, and Manpower over 150.49  
 
According to Statistics Netherlands, the number of temp work agency companies as well as their 
establishments boomed already between 1995 and 1999. In that period, the number of companies 
tripled and the number of establishments more than doubled. Yet, these figures really exploded after 
the liberalisation due to the new legislation of 1998-99. Growth continued up till 2004, when for the 
first time both the number of companies and that of establishments diminished. In January 2005, 
2,750 companies under NACE code 74501 and 1,465 companies under NACE code 74502 were 
counted, as well as 5,295 establishments under code 74501 and 1,775 under code 74502.50 Thus, the 
total number of agency companies amounted to 4,215, that of establishments to 7,070 (Table 4). As 
anybody can observe in Dutch cities, temp agency selling points are nearly as fluid as clothing stores. 
Their replacement rate is high: in 2003 1,700 establishments closed down and 1,820 started up.51  
 
In November 2005, 309 temp agency work companies had joined ABU, the main association of temp 
work agencies in the Netherlands52. These companies owned 2,600 selling points (establishments), 
                                                  
47   Based on the reported 37 percent share of the Dutch market in the total 2005 turnover of Randstad (Annual Report 2005). 
48   In 1985, this temp work agency was started up by the Netherlands Employment Office.  
49   Various websites, accessed by www.uitzendbureau.rubrieken.com  
50   CBS, Statline. 
51   ABU, Flex & Figures, May 2004. 
52   ABU, Flex & Figures, December 2005. 
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an average of 8.4 per company (2003: 3,050, average 10.8). In 2003 the five largest companies, all 
ABU members, owned 1,285 selling points: 18 percent of all agencies. We estimate the market 
share of this ‘top-5’ at approximately 45 percent. Another 76 percent of ABU members owned 1-5 
establishments.53 Moreover, in 2003 1,500 registered companies existed (with over 1,900 selling 
points) which were not affiliated with any association of temp work agencies.54 The small and 
medium-sized temp work companies are predominantly Dutch-owned. The very small companies 
usually operate from private homes. 
Since 1998, Statistics Netherlands registers (head-count) employment of temp agency staff per 
December. We show these figures in Table 5; they are not included in other tables. Staff 
employment doubled as well as ‘feminized’ in the 1998-2000 expansion period, then consolidated 
and diminished strongly in 2003 and 2004. In December 2000, staff still made up 11 percent of the 
number of workers mediated at that moment, and temp agencies had brought back that share in 
December 2004 to just over 9 percent.55
 
 
3.4  GENERALIST VERSUS SPECIALISED TEMP WORK AGENCIES 
The large temp work agency companies are essentially generalists. Yet, most of them have 
established specialized branches, aiming to create value added by offering services to higher skilled 
professionals. Most small temp work companies have specialised in particular occupations. A first 
group concentrates on skilled professionals, such as interim managers, software specialists, teachers, 
nurses, sea captains, accountants, and financial experts. A second group specializes in unskilled or 
semi-skilled work, the largest categories being cleaning workers, construction workers, and 
restaurant and hotel workers. Notably in this group, further specialization has developed. A third 
group concentrates on local or regional labour markets in particular industries, for example port 
workers in Rotterdam or shrimp pealers in Volendam.  
 
Unfortunately, in the Netherlands in the last decade very little research has been carried out on the 
interplay between temp work agencies and user firms: how specialisation ‘works’, how industry and 
regional markets are (being) divided, how the specific supply of services can stimulate user firms to 
use temps, how stable or even permanent relationships between agencies and user firms are, which 
kinds of agreements / arrangements are in use.  
 
                                                  
53   ABU, interview. In November 2005 this share was 75 percent. 
54   Zuidam & Grijpstra, 2004. 
55   Based on CBS, Statline, Banen van werknemers naar economische activiteit en geslacht. According to WageIndicator data from 
2000-2005, 32 percent of temp agency staff (n=341) itself had a fixed-term contract. 26 percent of this staff was younger than 25 of age, 64 
percent was 25-34 years. Their educational level was high: only 4 percent had primary education, 52 percent had secondary education and 44 
percent had higher education (n=365). Yet, their mean gross hourly wages were, with € 11.97, quite low (n=341). 
18   AIAS  -  UvA   Temporary agency work in the Netherlands 
In the last few years, some large temp agency companies are explicitly aiming at broadening their 
scope. They are offering broad packages of services. Randstad, notably, offers ‘HRM solutions (….) 
managing the optimal workforce’, including assessment; HR consultancy; secondment of HR 
specialists, HR outsourcing; mobility; reintegration and absenteeism management; online personnel 
and salary administration, and contract management (payrolling56). The research undertaken in the 
RSF project learns that temp work agencies especially for many (independent) call centres and food-
processing firms have taken over recruitment and selection of staff, and to a somewhat smaller 
extent in-company training as well. On this behalf, they growingly make use of in-company offices.  
The call centre industry is a striking example of a young industry exploring various options of the 
integration of temp agency work. At the peak of the labour shortages of call centres, in 2002, 
specialized agencies claimed that each day via them 15,000 employees worked for call centers. A 
ROA survey concluded that in 2004 about 65 percent of call centers employed temp agency 
workers. Most call centers had contacts with one or two dedicated temp agencies, although some 
use multiple agencies to take advantage of the competition between them. Recently temp work 
agencies co-operating with in-house call centres allow these centres to adopt larger flexibility in 
hours of servicing. Here, temp work agencies encounter various options: from a role near customer 
services, providing HRM expertise, training facilities, hiring and job evaluation competencies, and at 
long-term service contracts, to just providing low cost temp workers while competing mainly at 
cost levels. Yet, according to the ROA survey most call centres are rather suspicious not to 
outsource their recruitment and selection fully: only 14 percent of the Dutch centres did so.57
 
3.5  COMPETITIVE PRESSURES 
Especially in the slump of the early 2000s, competition between temp agency companies stiffened. 
After the liberalisation of 1999, more than 9,000 new temp work agencies have been established. 
Obviously about half of all went broke after some time. In 2003, the Netherlands Competition 
Authority (NMA) charged the ABU association for maintaining barriers to prevent new temp 
agencies from entering the market. However, the chairman of the Confederation of Netherlands 
Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) defended ABU, arguing that the temp agency market needed 
licensing to maintain quality levels.    ABU is concerned about temp work agencies with illegal 
activities entering the market. 58
 
It goes without saying that the temp agency industry is vulnerable to illegal practices. According to 
Dutch tax, police and union sources quite a number of malafide agencies are in operation, especially 
in construction and horticulture. In 2004 a research report confirmed these suspicions, concluding 
                                                  
56 In which construction Randstad legally functions as the employer. Seewww.randstad.nl/content
57  De Grip et al, 2005, 28-30.  
58 Zeker de uitzendbranche heeft een keurmerk nodig; VNO-NCW tegen NMA-beschuldiging, in Uitzendwerk (ABU), Nov/Dec 2003. 
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that one out of seven temp workers is placed by an illegal agency. 750 registered (!) temporary 
agency companies were suggested to engage in illegal activities. It was estimated that these 
registered companies are mediating 7,500 - 15,000 illegal workers. In addition, a considerable group 
of non-registered small firms was traced, leasing another 40,000 - 65,000 illegal temporary workers 
per year.59  
 
It has to be taken into account that all figures mentioned on this issue are rough estimates that 
should be treated with caution. Illegal agency workers are either not permitted to work in the 
Netherlands (80 percent) or they work through an agency that does not pay taxes and social 
insurance premiums for them (20 percent).60 This second category of illegal temporary agency work 
is especially difficult to measure. Moreover, four types of illegal employment can be distinguished; 
the first three types account for the 80 percent mentioned above, the last type accounts for the 
remaining 20 percent (Table 6). The first type refers to people working who are not legally entitled 
to be in the Netherlands, who are not registered, do not have a working permit and do not pay 
taxes and social insurance premiums. The second type is similar to the first, except that these 
workers pay taxes and social insurance premiums. The third type refers to people that live legally in 
the Netherlands but are not entitled to work. This group may or may not pay taxes and social 
insurance premiums. The fourth group is made up of people that are staying in the Netherlands 
legally, are also entitled to work, but do not pay taxes and social insurance premiums.  
 
 
3.6  SALES AND PROFITABILITY OF TEMP WORK AGENCIES 
We already stated that in 2005, the total Dutch temp work agencies’ (code 74501) sales was 
estimated to amount to €7 billion. This meant that they were still below the 2002 level, when 
according to Statistics Netherlands sales amounted to € 7,427 million (although in 2005 690,000 
persons were mediated, 6 percent over the 2002 total. Obviously the average terms worked as 
temps have been shortened and or wages/tariffs have been lowered in between). In 2002 total sales 
of companies under code 74502 were € 4,267 million. Table 7 shows a near-constant increase of 
the sales index of group 74501 since 1986 till 2001. It turns out that the 2001 decrease in the 
volume of temp agency work did not lead to a sales fall until mid-2002.61
 
Data on the profitability of the TWA industry at large is scarce and outdated. Table 8 indicates a 
decline in the average gross profitability in the NACE code 74501 category in the second half of the 
1990s: 5.9 percent in 1996, 5.3 percent in 1999. The table clearly shows that in 1996-98 profit rates 
                                                  
59   Zuidam & Grijpstra, 2004, 7-8. 
60   Zuidam & Grijpstra, 2004, 11. 
61   CBS, Statline. 
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before taxation were higher for larger companies. Unfortunately, Statistics Netherlands did not 
continue these statistics after 1999.  
 
Companies with stock exchange quotations and aspirations for international growth, like Randstad, 
faced substantial lower profit levels during the first years of the new Millennium. According to 
recent reports in the business press, from May 2004 on profit levels of the major temp work 
agencies were booming again. Currently, many vacancies are to be filled again, and with rapidly 
growing industry sales profit prospects are good as well. The largest Dutch agency with stock 
exchange quotation, Randstad, reported a spectacular 160 percent rise of its (international) net 
profits in 2004. In 2005, reported net total profits of Randstad rose to € 242 million, 25 percent 
above the 2004 figures, over a total turnover of 6,6 billion (15 percent above 2004 level), implying 
net profit rates of 3.6 over 2005 and 3.4 over 2004.62  The no. 2, USG People, was much less 
profitable, showing total net profit rates of 1.1 in 2004 and 0.7 in 2005.63
 
 
3.7  USERS OF TEMP WORK AGENCIES BY SECTOR AND FIRM SIZE 
Official statistics on the kind of work performed by temp agency workers hardly match with the 
ABU market division presented in section 2.1. By combining figures, we conclude that about half of 
all temp agency workers are currently engaged in some form of manual work, notably in 
manufacturing industry. In 2002, manufacturing industry accounted for about 30 percent of the 
mediated workforce and was, compared to the total workforce, clearly overrepresented (Table 9). 
In conformity with the declining share of manufacturing in the labour force, the temp agency 
companies recently report a declining share in servicing manufacturing: in 1996, the temp agency 
industry still reported to have more than half of their agency volume employed in manufacturing.64 
Just over one-third of temp agency workers will actually be engaged in administrative work. Yet, 
banking and insurance made over three times as much use of temp agency workers than the relative 
size of their total workforce. Transport and communications also showed an above-average use of 
temps.  
 
Considering the share of temp agency workers in the total (external) flexible workforce, we can 
only rely on older data. In 1997, this share was lowest in the sector retail, hotels, restaurants and 
repair: 21 percent.65 This finding matches with our results from the RSF industry and case studies, 
indicating that temp agency work hardly plays any role in labour supply in the retail industry and that 
it seems to be relevant in only a minority of hotels: here, outsourcing of notably housekeeping 
                                                  
62   Annual Report Randstad 2005 
63   Annual Report USG People 2005. 
64   CBS, Statistisch Zakboek 1997, 111. 
65   Dunnewijk, 2000, 74. 
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(room cleaning) is much more widespread. The shares of temp agency work in external flexibility 
were much higher in transport and communication (56 percent), government and education (67 
percent), manufacturing industry (84 percent) and financial and business services (94 percent).66  
 
Official statistics clarify that at the end of 2004 exactly 80 percent of all temp agency workers were 
employed in user firms of 100 and more employees: a substantial over-representation, as firms of 
this size at the time employed 60 percent of all Dutch wage-earners. On the other hand, less than 6 
percent of the temp agency workers could be found in user firms with less than 10 employees, 
although this size category employed 16 percent of all Dutch employees. Male temp agency workers 
can be found to a substantial higher degree than their female colleagues in small user companies 
(Table 10).  
 
 
3.8  MOTIVES FOR USING TEMP AGENCY WORKERS 
Major motives for companies to hire temp agency workers are peaks in production, mostly 
predictable peaks, as well as replacement of staff falling ill. An overview study of the European temp 
agency market distinguished three major categories for using temp agency workers, notably to 
provide employees for regular jobs, to provide specialised skills, and to help absorb fluctuations.67
 
Older research clarified that Dutch user firms use temp agency workers primarily for peaks in 
production (44 percent of the user firms), for specific temporary activities (38 percent), for 
replacement of absent employees (24 percent), or for seasonal activities (22 percent).68 In 
manufacturing industry, the share of user firms using temp agency workers for production peaks is 
higher than the average of all user firms, whereas ‘temporary activities’ as a reason is more often 
found in the services sector. One third of the user firms indicate that temp agency workers are used 
for permanent posts. This occurs relatively more often in small user firms. Only 15 percent of the 
user firms offer temp agency workers an opportunity to find a permanent workplace in the firm. In 
many industries the demand for temp workers shows a clear seasonal pattern. Traditionally, the 
number of agency hours is lowest in the first quarter of the year and it peaks in the third quarter.69 





                                                  
66   Dunnewijk, 2000; 2001. 
67   Koene et al, 2004. 
68   Van Bolhuis, 1996. Counting to over 100, as companies could give multiple answers. 
69   Moolenaar, 2002. 
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Here too, recent evidence on motives of user firms, related to their (flexibilisation) strategies and to 
cost advantages, is lacking. We already presented results from the RSF project. Unlike in the call 
centre industry, in the food-processing and hotel industries cost motives were dominant, also in the 
broader sense of avoiding risks of paying (higher) sickness or disablement premiums. In notably 
food-processing this included the outsourcing of high risk jobs to temp agency workers in a number 
of cases where lower processing jobs were more and more exposed to health and safety risks.  
 
 
3.9  RECENT INNOVATIONS IN TEMP WORK AGENCY STRATEGIES  
Given the competitive pressures among temp agencies, many companies are looking for new, more 
differentiated market niches. We already pointed at activities concerning recruitment, selection, and 
other HRM practices. The wide availability of the Internet also stimulates recruiting companies and 
employees in specific labour market segments.70 Some temp work agencies follow a strategy of 
specialization by focusing on particular industries or occupations. For instance, Randstad started up a 
subsidiary (Yacht) in order to mediate higher skilled employees. For these staff category, value 
added and wage levels are higher and so are the fees for the temp work agency. Randstad has also 
started a particular health department, for the mediation of nurses and caring jobs. In 2004 the 
company even focused on doctors when they were in short supply. 71
 
Another trend is the further internationalization of the sector. In the late 1990s, Randstad 
consciously sought to expand to other European countries in order to reduce economic and legal 
risks. In Germany, Randstad is currently business leader and in 2004 for the first time it gained 
profits there.72 Vedior, the second largest temp agency world wide, focuses more than Randstad on 
mediating specialists and has a strong position in France, the United Kingdom and Southern Europe. 
Since the accession of Central and Eastern European member states to the European Union, temp 
work agencies are setting up establishments in several of these states, above all in Poland. This 
country is considered a promising market with 38 million inhabitants and fast economic 
development. Since 2004, workers from Poland can work legally in all EU member states, although 
mostly with licenses, and by January 1, 2007, all legal limitations still in existence in the Netherlands 
in this respect will be removed. Motives for temp work agencies to expand in Poland include access 
to mediation for the local labour market (Randstad, Vedior), but attracting personnel for jobs in the 
Netherlands where Dutch workers are supposedly in short supply (Brouwer Personeel, BN Polen, 
et cetera) seems to dominate.73 Our colleagues carrying out case studies in the RSF project in 
notably meat-processing heard many rumours of Polish temp workers being paid substantially below 
                                                  
70   Het Financieele Dagblad, 23-03-2005. 
71   Het Financieele Dagblad, 26-02-2004. 
72   Het Financieele Dagblad, 08-11-2004. 
73   Het Financieele Dagblad, 17-08-2004. See also www.uitzendbureaus.rubrieken.com
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the wage levels laid down in the temp agency CLAs (see next section). There is scattered evidence 
suggesting that the large potential cost advantages for user firms of employing Polish workers may 
seduce even temp work companies regarded as bonafide to enter the twilight zone of doubtful 
mediating practices.74  
 
                                                  
74   Cf. the SIOD suspicion of fraud by a large temp agency, mediating Polish metalworkers as ‘seamen’, for which no licenses are needed. 
NRC-Handelsblad, 16-03-2006. 
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4.  THE DUTCH REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1  LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING TEMP AGENCY WORK 
 
From 1930 to 1998-99: various regulatory regimes 
For a long time, carrying out mediation of labour in the Netherlands was limited to the state. In 
1930 this state monopoly was laid down in the Labour Mediation Act (Arbeidsbemiddelingswet). The 
municipalities were allowed to shape the mediation process and a restrictive permit system for 
private mediation was introduced.75 In the 1960s, temporary agency work was practically outlawed 
in most European countries. This was strongly related to the fact that the ILO had issued 
Convention 96, stating that the placement of workers should be free of charge. At the end of the 
1960s and beginning of the 1970s, however, the idea developed that agency work constituted a 
triangular employment relationship. Under that model, there was no placement, as the user firm was 
not the employer. In the course of the 1970s, the acceptance of temp agency work grew, but the 
general idea remained that mediation of work should be left to the state. Convention 96 was not 
done away with until 1997, when the ILO adopted Convention 181 on private employment agencies 
and thereby opened the door to private temp work agencies.76  
 
Between 1945 and 1980 the Dutch state accorded itself an increasing number of tasks in the area of 
labour provision. Temp agency work came up in the Netherlands in the 1950s, and government 
efforts to control this type of labour go back to the end of that decade. The reasons for state 
intervention were two-fold: on the one hand to combat fraud with social premiums and on the 
other to prevent unfair competition resulting from such fraud. Temp agency work was seen as a 
threat to the classical employment relationship and to the public and private regulation of labour. In 
response to this, the Dutch government decided to regulate the temp agency market. In 1965, 
legislation passed on the mediation of labour (Wet op het ter beschikking stellen van arbeidskrachten, 
TBA). Yet, malafide labour brokers (‘koppelbazen’) remained active. In a tight labour market with 
considerable wage drift, ‘alien’ workers mediated by these brokers often received higher net wages 
than the regular workforce. In 1970, exactly these differences caused the large wildcat strikes in the 
Rotterdam port and shipbuilding industries, leading to considerable wage drift.77 In the same year, 
the government tried to remedy these problems by introducing a permit system for private 
mediation through agencies.78  
 
                                                  
75   Van der Heijden et al, 1995. 
76   Blanpain, 2004. 
77   Teulings & Leijnse, 1974. 
78   Fogarin, 1977. 
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Until the 1970s, employers’ associations and trade unions had hardly intervened in labour provision. 
Then, qualitative discrepancies between labour market supply and demand became manifest, 
clarifying that the official labour provision mechanism needed improvement; the negative image of 
the official mediation agencies, the Regional Employment Bureaus (Gewestelijke Arbeidsbureaus), at the 
time also responsible for the administration of the unemployment benefits, had to be done away 
with. Temporary agency work became the topic of heated debates.79 The union movement stuck to 
the view that commercial job mediation should only be allowed in case of temporary increases in 
demand.80 Yet, by the end of the 1970s, labour market issues had gained a central position in 
collective bargaining.81  
 
In the early 1980s unemployment rose rapidly, and the market share of the public employment 
agencies withered away below 15 percent of all movements on the labour market. Against this 
background, the employment agencies developed a stronger market orientation and focused on 
services directed towards employers’ demands. In the 1980s and early 1990s the Dutch government 
increasingly co-operated with unions and employers’ associations in the field of labour mediation, at 
the cost of its own role. In 1993 the administration asked the Social-Economic Council (SER) for 
advice on the regulation of temp agency work, and the debate on this issue spread widely. In the 
course of the 1990s, the movement towards a tripartite public labour provision apparatus, pushed 
jointly by social partners and public administration, was discredited because of its lack of results. 
Finally, by founding Centres for Work and Income (CWI), the government restored its dominance 
in the area of public labour provision.  
 
Legislation for temp agency workers includes both the regulation on the establishment of temp 
work agencies, the contractual relationship between temp agencies and the user firms, and finally 
the regulation of the employment relation between the temp work agency and the temp worker. 
Both international and national legislation is affecting temporary employment. Within the European 
union, the free movement of capital, goods, labour, and services is the central regulative concept. 
The European Acquis Communeautaire defines the level playing field for the international mobility of 
employees, both on a permanent and temporary basis. The most important forms of regulations 
regarding temporary work include the Posted Workers Directive (Detacheringsrichtlijn, 1996) and the 
Services Directive (Dienstenrichtlijn) that recently passed the European Parliament.  
1998-99: the Flexicurity / WAADI regime 
In the late 1990s, two species of legislation were introduced that are of relevance here. The 
Flexibility and Security (‘Flexicurity’) Act of 1999, replacing the 1965 law, is most important for the 
                                                  
79   Van Haasteren, 1977. 
80   Fogarin, 1977. 
81   Van der Heijden et al, 1995. 
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regulation of employment relationships in and by temp work agencies. The WAADI Act (Wet 
Allocatie Arbeidskrachten door Intermediairs; 1998) regulates the temp agency product market. The 
WAADI Act abolished the former license system, although the government kept the option open to 
reinstate such a system ‘in the interest of good relations on the labour market or the interests of 
the personell concerned’.82
 
In their policy publication, called ‘Flexibility and Security’ (1995), the Kok I administration stated that 
a new balance between flexibility and security in the labour market should be achieved. This 
administration defined as a normative principle: ‘Employment relations that are balanced, stable and 
flexible are the essence of a economic competitive and social justified labour system’.83 The 
substantial increase of temporary work cont(r)acts of substantial duration of was one of the most 
important reasons to search for a new regulatory framework84. The government asked for advice 
about this issue to the Labour Foundation (StAr), the national consultative body of the union 
confederations and employers’ associations. The Foundation produced an elabourate document with 
several proposals for legislation. This Flexibility and Security Agreement of 1996 can be considered 
as a follow-up of the New Course Agreement that the social partners agreed upon in 1993. Already 
in the latter Agreement, the Labour Foundation created room for the further flexibilisation of 
labour market relations. Subsequently, the unions lifted their veto position in this area in exchange 
for achieving a stronger position at the shop floor.85  
 
The basic idea of the Flexibility and Security Agreement is that permanent contracts of the 
incumbent work force should be relaxed in exchange for increasing the rights of the temporary 
workforce. The Act with the same title, operative from January 1, 1999, almost literally reflects the 
text of the 1996 Foundation agreement. The law allows more freedom for establishing and operating 
temp work agencies, although a license and a financial review from the major temp work agency 
association, ABU, are still needed. Already during the preparation of the act, the unions and 
employers’ associations negotiated the first ‘new style’ collective agreement for temp agency 
workers (see below).  
 
•  The 1999 Act includes the following modifications of Dutch labour law: 
•  companies can use temporary employment contracts up to three year (longer than they could 
before);  
                                                  
82   Clauwaert, 1999, 15. 
83   Kamerstukken 1995/96, 24 543 nrs.1,2 
84   According to CBS, Arbeid en lonen van werknemers 1994, 33,800 of the 144,900 temp workers were working more than two years 
for their temp work agency. 
85   Van der Meer et al, 2005. 
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•  two new legal presumptions concerning the employment relation and the extent of working 
hours per week were introduced. If a person has been employed on a regular base (weekly or at 
least 20 hours a month) during three months, an employment contract is presumed;  
•  a series of consecutive temporary employment contracts will, under certain conditions, lead to a 
permanent employment contract. If a person has been employed under three consecutive 
temporary contracts, the fourth contract will automatically be a permanent one; the same 
happens if the duration of more than one temporary contract exceeds 36 months;  
•  notice periods are shortened and simplified (now only the amount of working years has to be 
taken into account, whereas before the age of the employee was considered too);  
•  procedures for dismissal on economic, technical and organisational grounds are shortened;  
•  unemployment benefits are reduced if the employer awards severance pay. 
 
For temp work agencies the main implication of the new law was that agreements between them 
and employees were to be employment contracts. As temp work agencies are assumed to bear 
employer responsibility, this may lead to larger security for temp agency workers. After an initial 
period of maximum six months, the same rights have to be applied to temp agency workers as to 
employees with standard employment contracts, including the entitlement (after having been 
employed 18 months with the same user firm or three years with different firms) to a permanent 
employment contract with the agency. This regulation is applicable to various forms of employment, 
including temporary leasing, secondment, and labour pools.  
 
Preceding the adoption of the Flexicurity Act, on July 1st, 1998 the law on allocation of labour force 
through intermediates (WAADI) was adopted. WAADI meant an important liberalisation of the 
legal regime compared to the previous license system. Yet, under the WAADI act some previous 
norms were maintained, for example the prohibition to use temp agency workers to replace 
workers on strike. A first main stipulation of WAADI is that temp agency workers should receive in 
principle the same pay and renumeration as workers in the user firm in the same or in similar 
positions. Second, the temp agency should provide the temp agency workers with information 
relating to safety regulations and to needed qualifications in the user firm. The WAADI Act leaves 
room for deviations if agreed upon in CLAs. 
 
Combined with a revision of the Works Councils Act (Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, WOR) in 1998, 
the Flexicurity Act gave temp agency workers codetermination rights like those for the ‘regular’ 
Dutch workforce. These rights can apply to the temp work agency as well as to the user firm. If a 
user firm has employed a temp agency worker for at least two years, he or she is entitled to the 
same codetermination rights as permanent staff, provided the existence of an agreement with an 
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official temp work or secondment agency and provided that his/her activities fit in those of the user 
firm.86
 
4.2  ILLEGAL TEMP AGENCY WORK 
Recently, the introduction of a deposit of € 75,000 per temp work agency in order to bar out 
malafide agencies was discussed in Dutch parliament. The government proposal in question also 
suggested the introduction of a Declaration of Irreproachable Behaviour (Verklaring van onbesproken 
gedrag) per company. Yet, these proposals were badly received by both organized business and the 
political parties of the governing coalition, since it is expected that they will temper regular temp 
agency business and at the same time will not rule out illegal business.87 Yet, the unions and the 
Dutch association for small and medium-sized firms (MKB Nederland) plead for more far-reaching 
intervention, by establishing an industry-wide agency for the control of products and companies: 
‘We could benefit from some government support’, the newly elected FNV confederation president 
stated.88  
 
In the Netherlands the responsibility for controlling illegal employment and illegal activities of temp 
agencies lays with the Labour Inspectorate, which undertakes inspections mainly in horticulture, 
construction, hotels/cafes/restaurants, and the meat- and fish-processing industries. In its annual 
report over 2003, the Labour Inspectorate pointed to the rising identity fraud. The use of illegal 
personal permits and falsified identity papers has spread widely. In addition to underdeclaration of 
taxes and social security premiums, also social benefit fraud occurs. In 2003, 378 temp agencies 
were investigated and in 58 cases the Foreigner Labour Act was violated, on average for 5 
employees per case. 
 
Since 1 January 2005, the Labour Inspectorate is endowed with stronger authority to sanction firms 
employing illegal workers. Fines have been increased from € 1000 to € 8,000 per illegal worker. 
When illegal work turns out to be part of organized crime, the Labour Inspectorate will inform the 
Social Information and Search Agency (SIOD). In 2003 this happened in six cases. In the course of 
2005, the Labour Inspectorate started a large-scale inspection on illegal work through temp work 
agencies, planning to control 500 agencies. In addition, it aimed to visit 600 companies intensively 
using temp workers, especially for low-skilled manufacturing, eg. in metal- or wood-processing.89
 
                                                  
86   This implies that f.e. a temp cleaner working in a PR firm is not entitled to codetermination rights in that firm, contrary to a temp account 
manager. 
87   Het Financieele Dagblad, 28-02-2005. 
88   Het Financieele Dagblad, 04-03-2005.  
89   Jaarplan Arbeidsinspectie 2005, press sheet Ministry of SZW, nr. 05/27, 24-02-2005. 
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ABU, the main association of temp work agencies in the Netherlands, plays an active role in 
combating illegal work. In 2006, the so-called NEN norm4400-I was developed jointly by the 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the Minister of Finance and the ABU. This norm regulates 
on what conditions a temp agency is considered a bonafide enterprise. ABU is worried about both 
the good name of the industry and the loss of volume of business. A study, commissioned by ABU, 
revealed that still some 6,000 firms were involved in illegal work. ABU therefore pleads for more 
government control as far as illegal work was concerned.90
 
4.3  EXTENT AND NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON TEMP AGENCY 
WORK 
The largest employers’ association in the temporary agency work sector is the General Federation 
Temporary Work Agencies, ABU (Algemene Bond Uitzendondernemingen). With over 300 members, 
including all large firms, ABU represents about 65 percent of the temp agency work market. The 
association plays a major role in protecting quality standards. A younger employers’ association is 
the Dutch Federation of Mediation and Temporary Work Agencies, NBBU (Nederlandse Bond van 
Bemiddelings- en Uitzendondernemingen), representing about 10 percent of the market. The 228 firms 
that are members of NBBU are on average much smaller than their ABU colleagues and roughly 
own 450 selling points in total. Thus far the main unions have not recognized NBBU, whose 
members lease about 12 percent of all temp workers. 
 
The main unions active in the temp agency industry are FNV Bondgenoten (FNV Allies, affiliated to 
the FNV confederation), CNV Dienstenbond (CNV Services Union, affiliated to the CNV 
confederation), and De Unie, affiliated to the MHP confederation. Jointly they are reported to 
organise about 0.8 – 1.6 percent of temp agency workers, although the accuracy of this figure is 
questionable. It is hard to pinpoint how many union members work through a temp work agency 
because temp agency workers often register with a union as workers for the user firm, instead as 
workers for the temp agency.91 Anyway, the numbers of organised temporary agency workers are 
estimated to amount to 5,000-10,000.92. The FNV union may represent 75 percent, De Unie 15 
percent and the CNV union 10 percent.93  
 
Temp agency workers are for the larger part covered by two collective agreements (CLAs), one 
concluded by ABU with FNV Bondgenoten, CNV Dienstenbond and De Unie, and the other by NBBU 
with a small union not affiliated with one of the three recognised confederations, the Landelijke 
                                                  
90   ABU, 2006 
91   Van Ginkel et al, 2002. 
92   ABU (interview) mentioned 5,000, Van Ginkel et al (2002) 10,000 for 1999. 
93   Houwing & Van der Meer, 2004. 
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Belangen Vereniging (LBV, National Interest Association). Although FNV Bondgenoten participated in 
early negotiations, on the workers’ side also the recent NBBU CLA has only been signed by LBV.94 
The 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 ABU CLAs have got mandatory extension from the Minister of 
Social Affairs and Employment, meaning that firms that do not wish to be covered by the agreement 
should file for dispensation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Obviously, NBBU 
members and a couple of firms with company-level agreements were granted dispensation. Before 
mandatory extension, 74 percent of agency workers was covered by the ABU CLA. After 
mandatory extension, this share was about 94 percent (232,740 workers daily, 188,000 FTE). The 
NBBU CLA covers the remaining 6 percent. The ABU CLA applies to around 3,000 temp agency 
companies.95  
 
Recently, the temp agency industry witnessed various efforts at company level to be freed from the 
mandatory extension regulations. In 2003 notably some ‘payrollers’, like Van der Noordt 
Personeelsdiensten, tried so.96 This company agreed on an own CLA with the Van der Noordt 
employees’ organisation (Werknemersvereniging). Parties involved in the ABU CLA questioned the 
independence of this organisation; indeed, research by the Ministry resulted in serious doubts about 
this independence and hence, the Minister refused dispensation.97 Checking of websites in January – 
February 2006 learns that (the offer of) payrolling practices are (is) rapidly growing in the 
Netherlands.98 In September 2006, a CLA for payroll enterprises, among which Van der Noordt 




4.4  NATURE OF CLA’S APPLICABLE TO TEMP AGENCY WORK 
Regulating temp agency work in the temp agency firms 
The 2004-2009 ABU and NBBU CLAs both have similar provisions with regard to holidays (16 
hours for each month of work), safety at work, pensions, training et cetera. These provisions are in 
                                                  
94   See www.fnvflex.nl. 
95   ABU, 2003. 
96   Payroll companies are taking over staff from the using firm, including pay administration and HRM stasks. The construction is mostly used 
for partimers and the horeca industry. The most aggressive payroller is Van der Noordt Personeelsdiensten, having ties with which hundreds of horeca 
companies and claiming to have 9,000 employees. With this payroller, like with others, as most substantial social problem showed up that they did 
not pay pension premiums. ABU regards payrolling companies as temp agencies, and claims that they should be under the ABU CLA (see 
www.caoadvies.nl, last visit 27-02-2006).   
97   Rojer, 2004. Yet, recently the FNV horeca union (Horecabond) has agreed upon a company CLA with Van der Noordt. In December 
2005, Van der Noordt has been taken over by the Asito Dienstengroep (see www.vandernoordt.nl, last visit 27-02-2006).  
98   A group of payrollers announced that they will launch an own industry CLA as well as an employers’ association in Spring 2006. They 
have started negotiations with the FNV and CNV unions. The general manager of one of the larger payrollers, Payroll Select, claims that self-
regulation of the branch is needed faced with the proliferation of small agencies that are violating the applicable ABU or NBBU CLAs. Cf. Apeldoorn, 
2006. 
99   See www.vpo.nu.  
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accordance with the WAADI and Flexicurity Acts. Differences concentrate on the extension of the 
waiting period for a permanent contract: the ABU has extended this waiting period from one year 
to one-and-a-half year, the NBBU to two-and-a-half year. Thus, both CLAs have enlarged the 
opportunities for managerial flexibility. Another issue is that according to the ABU agreement temp 
workers receive payment according to the conditions of the user company after 26 weeks. In the 
NBBU CLA this immediately applies to all workers. A change in the new NBBU CLA compared to 
the previous one is that this agreement regulates the preservation of rights that have been built up 
under the previous CLA.  
 
Of major importance is the change from the four-phase system of the 1999-2003 CLA into a three-
phase system. The previous phases 1 and 2 are combined into phase A; phases B and C correspond 
with the previous phases 3 and 4. The result is that the temp agency worker can be leased for a 
longer period of time, i.e. 78 weeks (phase A). During the 1999-2003 period, employers tried to find 
ways to become more flexible apart from using of agency work, notably by promoting internal 
flexibility. By introducing more flexibility in the new CLA, ABU wanted to enlarge the attractiveness 
of temp agency work for employers.100  
 
Phase A can be regarded as the phase in which employees are hired out according to ‘pure 
temporary agency work conditions’. These conditions imply that if the user firm ends the contract 
with the temp work agency, the worker has no job and no pay101. When a temp agency worker falls 
ill, the contract with the user firm ends automatically. After 3 months of work, the user firm has to 
give notice before terminating the contract. This period of giving notice increases with the duration 
of work, up to two weeks after one year of work. The worker does not receive pay in case of 
illness or disability. In phase A the temp agency worker can terminate employment with one days’ 
notice. 
 
Agency work in phases B and C is usually termed seconding. Phase B is a period of two years or 
eight contracts, with a possible intermittent period of three months or less. If a user firm terminates 
the contract in phase B, the temp work agency is required to offer the worker suitable other work 
or a percentage of wages. In phase B, the worker and the agency can both terminate work, although 
the periods of notice are higher than in phase A. From phase B, a temporary agency worker starts 
                                                  
100   ABU interview R. Snel. 
101   However, the worker does receive state benefits of 71 percent of the last earned wage, and the collective agreement requires the agency 
to pay an additional 21 percent. 
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to build up a pension.102 In the new phase B it is no longer necessary to provide a worker with a 
contract of at least three months. 
In phase C the temp agency worker receives a contact from the agency for an unlimited period of 
time. The period of notice is now one month for both worker and temp agency. However, the 
employer needs a permit to fire the worker. If the user company cannot offer jobs, the temp work 
agency has to offer a suitable other job or continued pay. If the temp worker refuses a suitable 
other job, the right for pay or for assistance in finding another job expires. Table 11 provides an 
overview of the changes in leasing periods between the 1999-2003 and the 2004-2009 ABU CLAs. 
 
An ongoing issue for debate in the temp work agency industry is whether a temp agency worker is 
remunerated according to the wage of the user firm as laid down in the relevant CLA for that firm, 
or according to the wage as laid down in the temp agency CLAs. The new ABU CLA 2004-2009 
tries to solve these problems. This CLA entails that an agency worker is paid according to the temp 
agency CLA in the first 26 weeks of temporary employment. Although the CLA is valid for five 
years, the wage provisions can be re-negotiated annually. Wage demands for temp agency workers 
tend to follow the wage demands of roughly 30 other CLAs. As a result, collective bargaining 
conflicts rarely relate to wage increases, but mainly focus on the issue whether the CLA of the user 
company or that of the temp agency has to be applied. In 2001, an agreement was reached within 
the Labour Foundation with recommendations how to deal with this issue. One recommendation 
was that if a CLA has been mandatory extended, it should also apply to temp agency workers 
operating solely (or mainly) in the industry at stake. If, however, workers are leased to a number of 
industries, the agency pays the worker according to the temp work agency CLA.  
 
In February 2004, the employers’ associations and the unions in the Dutch temp work agency 
industry set up a foundation for the observance of the temp agency work CLA (Stichting Naleving 
CAO voor Uitzendkrachten, SNCU). If a CLA applies in a user firm in which stipulations have been 
included concerning wages or compensations of agency workers, these stipulations can apply instead 
of the ABU CLA articles 20 (on wages) and 30 (on compensation). To this end, parties in the user 
firm CLA were required to report such stipulations to the Foundation Reporting Bureau Temporary 
Agency Work Sector (Stichting Meldingsbureau Uitzendbranche, SMU). Yet, with the introduction of 
the 2004-2009 ABU CLA, the SMU procedure was done away with as the parties in the ABU 
agreement negotiated another remuneration scheme103, including that a temp agency worker having 
                                                  
102   The FNV Bondgenoten union regards the period of 78 weeks before pension rights can be built up as too long, especially as this period 
starts again each time a temp worker starts working for another agency. Negotiations with ABU on this issue broke in September 2006 
(www.fnvflex.nl, viewed 21-09-2006). 
103   Article 32 of the previous ABU CLA states that the temp work agency follows the wage agreements of the CLA of the user firm, if that 
CLA has been announced to the Stichting Meldingsbureau Uitzendbranche (SMU). If a CLA was not announced to the SMU Foundation, the ABU 
CLA was pending.  
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worked for the same agency and the same user firm for a period of 26 weeks should be paid the 
same wage as an worker employed by the user firm and performing a similar job. Wages to be paid 
by the user firm include compensations for overtime and work at unsocial hours, wage increases, 
travel expenses, and pension costs. This new remuneration scheme has been described as a simple, 
easy-to-use alternative for the SMU scheme. 
 
Regulating temp agency work in user firms 
If reference to the applicable CLA of the user firm is important for temp agency workers, which 
kind of clauses are agreed? In 2004, 84 percent of all Dutch employees were covered by a CLA.104 
The largest union confederation, FNV, was bargaining partner in 769 agreements, 92 percent of all 
CLAs in the Netherlands. Since 1995, FNV has developed a digital database where all agreements 
are coded for 650 different characteristics and from 2003 on, AIAS regularly transforms the 
database into a statistical dataset.105 We used this DUCADAM dataset to analyze the clauses with 
regard to temp agency work in the user firms. Table 12 shows that 275 out of 769 agreements (36 
percent) include such clauses. In branches where temp agency workers are most frequently found, 
the CLAs are most likely to have clauses on temp agency work, notably in Agriculture & Fishery, 
Mining & Manufacturing & Utilities & Construction, and in Wholesale & Retail & Hospitality.  
 
Which clauses have been agreed in CLAs? Using the DUCADAM dataset106 as of 2004, four kinds of 
clauses can be distinguished, notably clauses regulating a maximum for temp agency work, reasons of 
hiring temp agency workers, training for temp agency workers, and the transfer into a permanent 
employment contract. Unfortunately, the database does not have information whether wages are 
paid according to the CLA. Most likely, wages of temp agency workers are hardly issues in collective 
bargaining outside the temp agency industry itself. 
 
Regarding clauses regulating a maximum for temp agency work, only 9 agreements maximize the 
number of temp agency workers; another 12 maximize the share of temp agency workers in total 
staff. In most clauses, the maximum is less than 10 percent of total staff. Regarding the reasons for 
hiring temp agency workers, 70 agreements (9 percent) include clauses on this issue; some maximize 
the duration of the temp job, others state that temp agency workers cannot perform permanent 
jobs. 110 agreements (14 percent) contain clauses explicitly stating that temp agency workers can be 
offered a permanent employment contract in the user firm. 62 agreements (8 percent) contain 
clauses regulating that temp agency workers should receive training. 
 
                                                  
104   Information: Department of Social Affairs and Employment. 
105   Schreuder & Tijdens, 2004. 
106   We used only the coded dataset. It is possible that CLA texts have other clauses on temp work, which are not coded. 
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Ignorance among temp agency workers concerning their employment relationship and legal rights 
seems widespread. For example, in the Wageindicator data as of 2004, asked whether one was 
covered by a CLA, 26 percent of the temp agency workers reported that they did not know, 
compared to 11 percent of the dependent workforce at large.107 As could be expected, a larger 
share of temp agency workers indicated to work in a firm not covered by a CLA. 55 percent of 
them were covered by a CLA (of which 45 percent by the user firm CLA), compared to 66 percent 
of the dependent workforce.  
 
A recent development is the realisation of (sub)industry covenants on the use of flexible staffing, 
including temp agency workers. An example can be found in the meat industry, where temp agencies 
are quite active and in some larger firms even maintain in-house offices. The CLA for this sector, 
including slaughterhouses, already covered temp agency work, but after the implementation of the 
Flexicurity Act problems with fraud and illegal workers remained. Against this background in 2002 
employers’ associations and unions signed a Covenant Flexible Workforce, obliging companies to 
only make use of recognized temp work agencies. The covenant appeared to be so successful that 
malafide agencies tended to shift their operations to the adjacent meat processing sub-sector. In 
2005 the social partners in the latter industry integrated the covenant in their CLA.  
 
 
4.5  TEMP WORK AGENCIES AND DISADVANTAGED GROUPS 
In 2002, the temp work agencies mediated for a flow of 650,000 temp agency workers, of which 
170,000 (26 percent) stemmed from disadvantaged groups, broadly defined, such as older workers, 
disabled workers, workers from ethnic minorities, and unemployed workers.108 The temp agency 
industry claims that in 2005 it mediated for 26,000 persons with a disablement benefit. A number of 
temp agencies recently have entered this reintegration market, previously restricted to the official 
employment service.  
 
 
4.6  RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEMP WORK AGENCIES AND PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES 
As we already indicated, about a decade ago temp work agencies and the public employment service 
in the Netherlands were tough competitors, fighting for political legitimacy. The national public 
employment service was not considered to be effective or efficient, and suffered from management 
problems in terms of steering on output and budget control. At the same time, temp work agencies 
always had to distinguish themselves from illegal forms of allocation. In 1998, the year in which the 
                                                  
107   In Dutch the data is called Loonwijzer, see www.loonwijzer.nl. 
108   Nauta & Donker van Heel, 2005. 
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WAADI was introduced, the public employment service lost its monopoly in the provision of 
services for labour market allocation. In 2002, by the new SUWI (Structuur uitvoering werk en 
inkomen) Act, aiming at integrating the public agencies for labour market intermediation and the 
national agencies for the distribution of social security benefits, a free market for the provision of 
reintegration services has been created: public ‘principles’ hire private ‘agents’ for the provision of 
training, work experience, and reintegration trajectories to job seekers. Thus, temp work agencies 
nowadays compete with other private businesses in mediating job seekers, largely paid by public 
funds. In addition, temp work agencies play a role in covenants that have been established between 
government agencies and interest organizations at national level in order to bring down youth 
unemployment, the influx into the Occupational Disability Act, etcetera. 
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5. THE  DUTCH TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKFORCE:  COMPOSITION, 
WAGES, WORKING CONDITIONS, TRAINING AND CAREERING 
5.1  COMPOSITION OF THE TEMP AGENCY WORKFORCE 
Trends in employment 
The 2004 ’influx’ estimate, concerning the number of those starting to be engaged in temp agency 
work in given year, came to 615,000 (head-count). Of these 615,000 persons, 488,000 (79 percent) 
belonged to Phase A and 127,000 to Phases B or C.109 This estimate covers a wide variety of temp 
agency workers, from those that worked through a temp work agency over the year to workers 
that did so only a couple of days. Table 13 shows that between 1995 and 2002 the temp agency 
workforce fluctuated, but that the 2002 level almost equalled the low 1995 level. Whereas FTE 
figures clearly peaked in 1999, the head-count numbers did so in 1996 and 1999, indicating that the 
duration of a temp agency job was shorter in 1996 than in 1999. Summarizing, over the past ten 
years temp agency work expressed in FTEs has shown a steep increase until 1999, a decline since 
then, and an increase again from the second quarter of 2004 on. The head-count development 
reveals a flatter pattern, indicating that the duration of temp agency jobs was longest when temp 
agency work was at its peak – although, as our section on working hours in Chapter 4 shows, 
working more hours per week during an economic upswing will also play a role here. 
 
Employment status and education 
For typologies of temp agency workers on employment status and education we have analysed the 
2004 data of the Dutch WageIndicator, collected via a web-based survey.110 In the 2004 data, 1.7 
percent of the observations concerned a temp agency worker. Of this group, one out of ten 
indicated to be a school pupil or student. Another five percent was a housewife/man with a job on 
the side, partly disabled, unemployed, or working without loss of unemployment benefits. More than 
one out of four considered him- or herself an employee, and the remaining half called him- or 
herself a temp agency worker. 
 
Temp agency work is often associated with people with a weak position in the labour market.111 
Recent evidence does not point straightforward to such a position. If one looks at employment 
status the ‘weak position’ thesis may be correct, regarding educational level some question marks 
seem justified. Since 1999, the share of unemployed in total numbers of those engaged in temp 
agency work at least once in a given year has grown to over one-third of this population (2004: 37 
percent). The share of ethnic minorities recently also grew, to 17 percent in 2004.112  
                                                  
109   Nauta & Donker van Heel, 2005. 
110   See www.Wageindicator.org. Calculations by Kea Tijdens. 
111   Brusse & Donker van Heel, 2003. 
112   Nauta & Donker van Heel, 2005. 
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With regard to educational level the distribution of agency workers in the Netherlands is as follows: 
in 2002, 72 percent of agency workers had secondary education (total workforce in 2001: 44 
percent), 11 percent had primary education (total Dutch workforce: 29 percent), and 17 percent 
(total: 27 percent) had higher education. The figures for temp agency workers have been relatively 
stable from 1996-2002.113 Obviously, the low and the high educational levels are underrepresented 
in the temp agency workforce. Yet, it can be added that in the Netherlands many temp agency 
workers are pursuing further education while working.114
 
For a more detailed picture of educational background we used calculations based on the Dutch 
WageIndicator dataset. According to these calculations, temp agency workers did not significantly 
differ from other workers with regard to their years of education. However, compared to all wage 
earners in this dataset temp agency workers more often had enjoyed general education instead of 
vocational education: 40 percent of temp workers had general education against 31 percent of the 
dependent workforce. Against this background it is quite obvious that the capacities of many temp 
agency workers are underutilitized. According to WageIndicator data, compared to all Dutch wage 
earners temp agency workers worked in occupations that required significantly less time to master 
the job: on average 5.4 weeks against 17.6 weeks. Temp agency workers significantly more often 
reported that they are too high educated for their job: 41 percent against 18 percent for the 
dependent workforce. 
 
Gender and age  
Temp agency workers are typically young workers. A study by Statistics Netherlands showed that in 
2002 almost 70 percent of the temp agency workers (NACE 7450) were in the age bracket of 15-34 
years. Another 20 percent was in 35-44 of age, and the remaining 10 percent could mainly be found 
in the age bracket 45-54. Temp agency workers proved to be relatively younger than the workforce 
of any other large branch of industry.115  
 
More recent data, only for the 74501 group, confirms this picture: in December 2004 68 percent of 
the temp workers registered could be found in the 15-34 years’ bracket, 18 percent was in the 35-
44 years’ category, and only 14 percent was 45 or older. The male temp workforce was even 
younger, with 70 percent in the 15-34 years’ bracket, against 66 percent of the females. Yet, the 
more detailed figures reveal both the numbers and the share of the youngest temp workers have 
                                                  
113   Berkhout & Van Leeuwen, 2004; CBS, Statline. 
114   Brusse and Donker van Heel, 2003. 
115   Melser, 2004. 
38   AIAS  -  UvA   Temporary agency work in the Netherlands 
substantially diminished between 2000 and 2004, and that those of older groups, notably the 40-49 
of age, have grown – reinforcing a tendency that became visible at the end of the 1990s.116  
 
In the WageIndicator dataset, temp agency workers are on average 28 years old, compared to 34 
years for all employees. Temp agency workers were particularly more often to be found in the age 
bracket 20-24 years. This applies even more to the females than to the males. Males are also 
overrepresented in the age bracket 15-19. For males and females temp agency workers are 
underrepresented in all age brackets from 30 years on. Within the age brackets up to 30 years, 
temp agency workers do not differentiate from employees with regard to children. 
 
In 2002, the distribution of the Dutch temp agency workforce in terms of gender was slightly in 
favour of the males: 53 percent male, 47 percent female.117 The dip in temp agency work in 2003 
affected the female temp workforce much more than the male, and the recovery in 2004 did not 
reverse the picture. As a consequence, the male share in both the 2003 and 2004 figures was 59 
percent. These figures imply that the shares of male and female temp workers in their respective 
parts of the total Dutch workforce hardly differed. 
 
Working hours 
The distribution of weekly working hours of male and female temp agency workers for December 
2004 can be found in Table 14. At that moment the FTE/head-count ratio was 65 percent, against 57 
in 2000, 59 in 2001, and 58 in both 2002 and 2003.118 These figures confirm that in an economic 
upswing temp agency workers tend to work more hours per week.  
As could be expected, the female temp agency workers do work more part-time than their male 
colleagues. Yet, the differences are much smaller than in the Dutch workforce at large. It is, for 
example, remarkable that in December 2004 only 39 percent of the male temp agency workers 




Tenure is a hot issue in the Dutch temp agency industry, and is closely related to (changes in) labour 
legislation. Table 15 provides an overview as of December 2004.  Tenures of men and women 
mediated by temp agencies obviously hardly differ. Remarkably enough, in spite of current Dutch 
legislation, just over 5 percent of the temp agency workforce remains 5 years or longer in temp 
                                                  
116   Cf. Brusse & Donker van Heel, 2003, 19-21. 
117   Berkhout & Van Leeuwen, 2004. 
118   Based on CBS, Statline. 
119   CBS, Statline. 
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agency work (although this may be in temp agency work in general and not necessarily with the 
same temp work agency).  
 
Migrant workers 
Compared with their share in the total Dutch workforce, migrant workers, from western or from 
non-western origin, are comparatively more often employed via temp work agencies. In 2000, the 
total share of migrants in the temp agency workforce was 33 percent, compared to 18 percent in 
the workforce at large. Of that group, two-thirds stemmed from an ethnic minority (Table 16). 
Within the category workers from non-western origin, differences between the first and the second 
generation can be traced, the latter group showing higher shares of temp agency workers than the 
first group: 17 versus 13 percent.120 In 2003, the share of migrants in the temp agency workforce 
had gone up to 35 percent, compared to 16 percent in the workforce at large.121
 
 
5.2  TEMP AGENCY WORKERS’ WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS  
Wages 
Statistics Netherlands data gives an average gross hourly wage of temp agency workers for 2004 of 
€11.85 for men and €11.58 for women (Table 17). These figures hardly differ from WageIndicator 
outcomes and come close to the mean gross hourly temp workers wage of €11.88 calculated from 
the WageIndicator data of 2003-2004. Jointly these figures imply that the mean temp agency workers’ 
wage stood in 2003-2004 at 65 percent of the total average gross hourly wage for the Dutch 
workforce and at 94 percent of the wage threshold i.e. at two-thirds of the Dutch mean.122 If we 
compare these mean wages to the standard wages as laid down in the ABU CLA 2004-2009, their 
level is comparable with the start wages in function group 9; they are close to the end wages of 
functional group 4 as well: see Table 18. 
 
Statistics Netherlands figures show that temp agency workers’ wages in the youngest age bracket 
are higher than the Dutch average, but that for all older groups temp agency workers earn less than 
that average, growing to large differences for all of 30 years and older: from 31 (females) – 45 
percent (males) for those at the age of 30-34 ranging to 41 (females) – 75 percent (males) for those 
aging 45-49. In a majority of cases, remaining a temp agency worker or returning to temp agency 
work may imply growingly falling behind in wages. Again, recent WageIndicator data confirms this 
picture, showing that 50-59 year old temp agency workers earn € 6 per hour less than non-
                                                  
120   Melser et al, 2004. 
121   ABU, Flex & Figures, February 2005. 
122   CBS, Statline. 
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temps.123 A positive point to be noted is that the gender wage gap in temp agency work is quite 
small: in December 2004 the smallest of 22 Dutch industries.124
 
Relating wages to the Statutory Minimum Wage (SMW) emphasizes the (low) wage position of temp 
agency work in the Netherlands. Table 19 makes clear that in December 2004 over 40 percent of 
the males and over 50 percent of the female temp agency workers earned 130 percent or less of 
the SMW. In this respect the temp agency industry came closest to the retail industry, a notorious 
low wage sector. 
 
Particularly the impact of the legislation mentioned earlier as well as that of the ABU CLA is 
important for an understanding of the dynamics of low-wage work in the Dutch temp work agency 
industry. The workers employed by the agencies are quite likely to have higher earnings than temp 
workers not employed by them. Presumably as a consequence of the recent change in legislation, in 
the first quarter of 2004 the agreed wages according to the temp agency CLA were 20 percent 
higher compared to 2000, whereas the average wage increase in all industries in this period was only 
12 percent.125 Probably because of this increase, ABU is now in favor of lowering the statutory 
minimum wages, pointing at the recent influx of low-paid migrant workers.126  
Following data from the Dutch WageIndicator, the mean gross hourly wages of temp agency workers 
are considerably lower than those of ‘ordinary’, permanent workers in the same industries (Table 
20). The table reveals that in industries where permanent workers have low wages, the temp agency 
workers also have those, whereas in sectors where wages are relatively high, the temp agency 
workers earn higher wages too. For the call centre industry this picture is confirmed by the ROA 
survey mentioned earlier, as it allows to divide between permanent and temp workers in in-house 
(relatively high paid) respectively outsourced call centres (relatively low paid).127
 
Working conditions 
Working conditions of temp agency workers cannot be described in general terms but should be 
linked with industry-specific outcomes and factors. The results of Dublin Foundation research match 
closely with those based on WageIndicator data. The first research found no significant differences 
between temp agency and permanent workers (both divided in full- and parttimers) concerning 
experienced fatigue, backache, and muscular pains. Yet, job dissatisfaction was much larger among 
temp agency workers, both fulltimers and parttimers. On the other hand, stress levels were 
                                                  
123   Tijdens & Van Klaveren, 2006. 
124   CBS, Statline. 
125   The index of wages agreed in the CLAs for temp agency workers in NACE 74501 (excluding permanent temp agency workers and staff) 
was 119,1 in January 2005 (2000=100). CBS, Statline. 
126   ABU, Flex & Figures, February 2005. 
127   De Grip et al, 2005, 33-4. 
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considerably lower.128 According to WageIndicator data, Dutch temp agency workers report less 
heavy working conditions than workers on average do. Again, they report less emotional strain and 
less work pressure, but remarkably enough also less physical hardships. This last outcome may be 
linked with the fact that they also filled out to carry out less monotonous tasks. Of course, the 
question remains whether these judgements are coloured by the temporary character of the 
work.129 Earlier Dutch research found that high job dissatisfaction was closely linked with the 
motives to engage in temp agency work.130
 
In 2002-04, both sickness rates and the influx (of fully disabled) into the Occupational Disability Act 
of temp agency workers were at higher levels than those of permanent workers. This had only 
partly to do with industry, job, age and gender characteristics; part of the explanation may also be 
found in less management attention for sick temp agency workers, their recovery process and their 
reintegration in the labour process. Temp agency workers in health care, retail and wholesale as 
well as in transport had significantly higher sickness rates than their colleagues / permanent workers, 
whilst in the cleaning industry this was just the opposite.131 In 2003, the social partners, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment and the social benefits’ administrator UWV agreed upon a 
Working Conditions Covenant (Arbo-convenant) for the temp work agency industry. In practice, the 
lack of (formal) responsibilities of both temp work agencies and user firms for disabled workers 
proves to be a major handicap for their reintegration and return to work.132
 
 
5.3  TRAINING PROVISIONS AND CAREER PROSPECTS FOR TEMP AGENCY 
WORKERS  
Training provisions 
Temp agency workers, and flexible workers in general, constitute a category of workers that are 
less likely to receive employer-provided training. This is due to the fact that employers want to 
ensure that they get a return on their investment in people; this return is uncertain in the case of a 
flexible worker. In the Netherlands, provisions on the training of temp agency workers are laid 
down in the ABU CLA. This CLA stipulates that temp work agencies are required to make a 
reservation for training budgets, totalling 1.02 percent of the wage bill. Since 2004, when a national 
training foundation was set up, employers are receiving European Social Fund (ESF) subsidies for half 
of their training budgets. Training before a temp agency worker starts to work for the user firm is 
also paid out of this 1,02 percent levy. According to the 2004-2009 ABU CLA training should always 
                                                  
128   Goudswaard & Andries, 2002; Stener Pedersen et al, 2005. 
129   Tijdens & Van Klaveren, 2006. It may be noted that these results fit well into the notion of ‘underutilization’ developed by Karasek. 
130   Miedema & Klein Hesselink, 2002. 
131   Arents et al, 2003; Arents et al, 2005. 
132   Arents et al, 2005; Veerman, 2005. 
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be job-related. Temp agency workers can accumulate a personal training budget (POB) from the 26th 
week of phase A, which is available in phase B. They can choose not to undertake training, in 
exchange for receiving this budget in cash.  
 
According to WageIndicator data in reality temp agency workers receive much less training and 
educational courses than other workers: on average, two-thirds of all workers have followed 
training courses with the employer, against one-third of the temp workers. If we concentrate on 
those having received training in the preceding year, the number of days of training of the temp 
agency workers is less than average. It may not come as a surprise that temp agency workers more 
frequently than average state that they are occupied below their educational level.133 This outcome 
is in line with the results of earlier European research.134
 
Careering: does temp agency work lead to permanent employment? 
The motives that employees can have to engage in temp agency work can be reduced to three 
categories: 1. working through the agency is a job ‘on the side’, in addition to for example studying; 
2. temp agency work as a ‘stepping stone’ or ‘jumping board’ to a permanent job, and 3. regard 
themselves as ‘stayers’, wishing to establish a permanent relationship with the temp work agency. In 
2002 the three categories had shares in the Nerherlands of 34, 55 and 11 percent respectively.135 
With regard to temp agency work as a ‘stepping stone’, it has been reported that from all 
permanent jobs found by unemployed people, one out of seven is found through temp agency work. 
Between 1993-2002, about one-third of Dutch agency workers, between 200,000 and 250,000 
people yearly, find a permanent job through temp agency work.136  
 
Over half of all temp agency workers in the Netherlands prove to regard temp work as a means to 
obtain regular employment. A body of Dutch research has shown that temporary jobs in general 
(i.e. including fixed-term jobs, on call contracts and subsidised temporary jobs) fulfil this stepping-
stone function towards regular work rather well.137 With regard to temp agency work as a specific 
type of temporary employment, there is evidence that about half of all temp agency workers finds a 
regular job after one year in temp agency work.138 Other research found that 33 percent of those 
finding a job by temp agency work in a given year obtained a regular job in the next year. Chances of 
obtaining a regular job proved to be higher than average (40 percent) for those regarding agency 
                                                  
133   Tijdens & Van Klaveren, 2006. 
134   Stener Pedersen et al, 2005. 
135   ABU, 2003. 
136   Brusse & Donker van Heel, 2003, 19. 
137   A.o. Kleinknecht et al, 1997; Zijl et al, 2004. 
138   Zijl & Van Leeuwen, 2005. 
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work as a stepping stone.139 One should keep in mind that such figures are to a large extent 
dependent on the labour market situation. Bevauase of the fact that the latter (high) figures relate to 
2000-01, it is quite likely that tight labour market conditions contributed substantially. Indeed, in 
2004 the share of temp workers finding a permanent job was lowered to 27 percent. As the 
upswing of the business cycle in the course of 2004 was still weak, employers were hesitating in 
recruiting permanent staff.140
 
Recently, longitudinal data have been used in analysing the relation between unemployed finding jobs 
and temp work. The results show that temporary jobs shorten the duration of unemployment, but 
do not increase the fraction of unemployed workers finding regular work within a few years after 
entry into unemployment. These authors found that 80 percent of the unemployed having accepted 
a temporary job acquired a permanent job within five years. Without using this indirect route, this 
share would have been only 50 percent. Moreover, the indirect route to permanent work proved to 
be quicker than the direct one.141  
 
                                                  
139   Van der Ende & Versantvoort, 2002. 
140   Nauta & Donker van Heel, 2005. 
141   Zijl et al, 2004. 
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TABLES 
Table 1  External numerical flexibility, the Netherlands, 1996-2005 (x1,000 and in % of dependent workforce, head-count), 
total and by gender 
total  A 
1996  1998  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005 
numerical  flexibility  x  1,000    549 609 537 488 467 480 520 
numerical flexibility in  %  10.0  10.4  8.8 7.7 7.4 7.7 8.5 
temp  agency  workers  x  1,000    191 226 195 178 148 157 171 
temp  agency  workers  in  %  3.5 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.8 
workers on call / substitute x 1,000  166  187  119  101  105  103  121 
workers  on  call  /  substitute  in  %  3.0 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.0 
other  flexible  workers  x  1,000  192 196 223 209 214 220 228 
other  flexible  workers  in  %  3.5 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.7 
dependent  workforce  x  1,000    5464 5850 6120 6338 6313 6219 6121 
 
males  B 
1996  1998  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005 
numerical  flexibility  x  1,000    254 272 263 243 248 250 269 
numerical flexibility in  %  7.5 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.9 
temp  agency  workers  x  1,000  106  126  99 96 92 97 106 
temp  agency  workers  in  %  3.1 3.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.8 3.1 
workers on call / substitute x 1,000  53  56  41  36  40  40  45 
workers  on  call  /  substitute  in  %  1.6 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 
other flexible workers x 1,000  95  90  123  111  116  113  119 
other  flexible  workers  in  %  2.8 2.5 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.5 
dependent  workforce  x  1,000    3370 3525 3619 3664 3608 3522 3426 
 
females  C 
1996  1998  2000  2002  2003  2004  2005 
numerical  flexibility  x  1,000  295 337 274 245 219 230 251 
numerical flexibility in  %  14.1 14.5 11.0 9.2  8.1  8.5  9.3 
temp  agency  workers  x  1,000  85 100  96 82 56 60 66 
temp  agency  workers  in  %  4.1 4.3 3.8 3.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 
workers on call / substitute x 1,000  113  131  78  65  65  63  77 
workers  on  call  /  substitute  in  %  5.4 5.6 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.9 
other flexible workers x 1,000  97  106  101  98  98  108  109 
other  flexible  workers  in  %  4.6 4.6 4.0 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.0 
dependent  workforce  x  1,000    2094 2325 2501 2674 2705 2697 2695 
Source: CBS, Statline 
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Table 2  Ten most frequent temp agency occupations, the Netherlands, 2000 
1 Production  worker 
2 Storehouse  worker 
3 Cleaner 
4 Telephone  operator 
5 Packer 
6 Data  typist 
7 Administrative  worker 
8 Secretary 
9  Canteen worker  
10  General services worker  
Source: ABU, 2000 
 
 






x 1,000  index  x 1,000  index 
2001 412  100  278,4  100 
2002 389  94  256,9  92 
2003 364  88  247,4  89 
2004 376  91  255,2  92 
Source: CBS, Statline  
 
 
Table 4  Numbers of temp agency work companies and establishments, the Netherlands, 1995-2005 (per January 1) 
companies  establishments  code 
74501  74502  total  74501  74502  total 
1995 385  255  640  1,420  295  1,715 
2000 1,565  770  2,335  3,730  970  4,700 
2002  2,625  1,175 3,800 5,320 1,485 6,805 
2003  2,760  1,300 4,060 5,515 1,710 7,225 
2004  2,765  1,470 4,235 5,545 1,800 7,345 
2005  2,750  1,465 4,215 5,295 1,775 7,070 
Source: CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 5  Development of employment of Dutch temp agency staff, head-count, 1998-2004, December 
Employed persons x 1,000   
male  female  total 
1998 5.9  6.6  12.5 
2000 8.4  16.1 24.5 
2002 8.7  16.0 24.7 
2003 8.6  14.2 22.8 
2004 7.2  12.3 19.5 
Source: CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 6  Four types of illegal employment in temp agency work, the Netherlands, 2003 






Worker does not 
have a working 
permit 
Agency/worker does not 
pay taxes / social 
premiums 
% of illegal 
employment 
1  X  X  X  X        )         
2  X  X  X          )        80 % 
3      X  (X)        )         
4      X  20  % 
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Table 7  Sales of the temp work agency industry, the Netherlands, 1990-2004 (NACE 74501) (2000 = 100, excl. VAT) 
  all firms  large firms 
1990  35 40 
1991  35 40 
1992  35 39 
1993  32 35 
1994  39 43 
1995  51 57 
1996  63 70 
1997  76 83 
1998  90 97 
1999  95 99 
2000  100 100 
2001  106 102 
2002  102 95 
2003  98 . 
2004  100 . 
Source: CBS, Statline, Omzetindices Kwartaalomzetindices en uitzenduren 
 
 
Table 8  Profit rates before taxation for temp work agency companies, categories of turnover, the Netherlands, 1996-1999 
(NACE 74501) 
  all  < € 250,000   € 250,000-1 mln  € 1- 3 mln  > € 3 mln 
1996 5.9  4.2  3.0  5.8  6.0 
1997 5.7  4.6  1.1  5.2  5.8 
1998 5.4  6.6  3.5  4.7  5.4 
1999 5.3  .-  .-  .-  .- 
Source: CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 9  Leasing of temporary staff by industry, the Netherlands, 2002 
Industry  % of temp 
agency 
workersl 
% of total 
workforce 
Manufacturing industry  30  19 
Government, public administration, and education  15  20 
Retail, wholesale, hotels, catering  12  21 
Health care, welfare, culture  12  18.5 
Banking and insurance  11  3.5 
Transport and communication  10  6 
Other commercial services (profit)  6  6 
Other services (non-profit)  2 
Construction- and ￿nstalment firms  2 




Sources: Brusse & Donker van Heel, 2003; CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 10  Distribution of employees in temp agency work by size of user company, the Netherlands, (31-12-)2004 
Employees  male  female  total 
  X 1,000  %  x 1,000  %  X 1,000  % 
< 10  9,0  7.2  3,2  3.9  12,2  5.8 
10-99 21,3  17.0  8,6  10.0  29,9  14.2 
>= 100  94,9  75.8  73,7  86.1  168,7  80.0 
Total  125,2  100.0  85,6  100.0  210,8  100.0 
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Table 11  Distribution of leasing periods over phases 1-2 and 3-4, the Netherlands 
CLA 1999 – 2003  CLA 2004 – 2009 
Phases  Duration  Phases  Duration 
1+2  52 weeks  A   78 weeks 
3  26-104 weeks  B   104 weeks 




Table 12  Percentages of collective agreements with clauses on temp agency work, the Netherlands, 2001-2003 








total N  
A/B   Agriculture, fishery  55  9  27  9  11 
C-F   Mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction  44  11  13  6  371 
G/H Wholesale,  retail,  hospitality  38  6  9  15  80 
I   Transport, storage, communication  25  6  8  6  125 
J/K   Financial institutions, commercial services  28  11  9  13  87 
L-N   Administration, education, health, welfare  22  5  41  5  41 
O   Culture, leisure and other services  24  11  31  13  54 
Total  36  9 14  8 769 
Source:  FNV CAO Database 2004 (CLAs agreed in 2001 (186), 2002 (157), and 2003 (426)). 
 
 
Table 13  Total number of persons yearly mediated through a temp agency, the Netherlands, 1995-2005 












Source:  Brusse & Donker van Heel, 2003; Nauta & Donker van Heel, 2005; ABU Press Sheet 08-02-2006 
 
 
Table 14  Distribution of weekly working hours of temp agency workers by gender, head-count, the Netherlands, December 
2004 
Gender  male  female  total 
  x 1,000  %  x 1,000  %  x 1,000  % 
< 12 hours  25,1  20.0  23,0  26.9  48,1  22.8 
12-<20 hours  14,6  11.7  14,5  16.9  29,1  13.8 
20-<25 hours  13,1  10.5  11,7  13.7  24,8  11.8 
25-<30 hours  7,7  6.2  6,2  7.2  13,9  6.6 
30-<35 hours  16,3  13.0  10,1  11.8  26,4  12.5 
>=35 hours  48,4  38.7  20,1  23.5  68,5  32.5 
Total  125,2  100.0 85,6  100.0 210,8  100.0 
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Table 15  Distribution of tenure of temp agency workers by gender, head-count, the Netherlands, December 2004  
tenure  male  female  total 
< 1.5 year  76.7  76.2  76.5 
>=  1.5  year  23.3 23.8 23.5 
     
0  year  67.5 67.0 67.3 
1  year  15.7 14.6 15.2 
2-<5  years  11.4 13.3 12.1 
5-<10  years 4.6 4.3 4.5 
10-<20  years  0.6 0.8 0.7 
>=20  years  0.0 0.2 0.1 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Tot empl (1,000) 125,2  85,6  210,8 
Source: CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 16  Temp agency workers (incl. own temp agency staff) by ethnicity, head-count, the Netherlands, 2000 (x 1,000 and in 
%) 
  Total   Natives   Migrants  Western  Non-
western 
total 




x  1,000   298,3 199,1 99,2   
   33,5  65,9   
    9,7  14,2 14,0 7,7  20,0 
%  100.0  66.7  33.2  11.2  22.0  3.3 4.8 4.7 2.6 6.7 
Source: Melser et al, 2004 
 
 
Table 17  Gross hourly wages (€) and m/f wage differences by gender and age, the Netherlands, temp agency workers and 
total dependent workforce, 2000-04 
temp agency workers  age  gender/wage diff. 




males  6.05 7.17 6.93 6.23 
females  5.84 6.80 7.11 5.54 
15-19  
(m-f) on % f   3.5  5.2  2.6  11.1 
males  9.17  10.67 10.74 11.16 
females  9.11  10.86 10.56 10.99 
20-24 
(m-f) on % f  0.7  - 1.8  1.7  1.5 
males  10.84 12.86 12.26 14.81 
females  11.10 12.50 12.30 14.49 
25-29 
(m-f) on % f  - 2.4  2.8  - 0.3  2.2 
males  11.22 13.12 12.52 18.07 
females  10.84 13.44 12.66 16.76 
30-34 
(m-f) on % f  3.4  - 2.4  - 1.1  7.2 
males  10.22 13.80 12.93 20.21 
females  10.37 13.20 12.55 17.54 
35-39 
(m-f) on % f  - 1.5  - 4.3  2.9  13.2 
males  11.77 13.30 13.11 21.68 
females  10.43 12.63 12.43 17.35 
40-44 
(m-f) on % f  11.4  5.0  5.2  20.0 
males  11.37 14.49 12.97 22.72 
females  10.76 12.50 12.39 17.49 
45-49 
(m-f) on % f  5.4  13.7  4.5  23.0 
males  11.82 14.16 13.81 23.28 
females  11.56 12.42 12.75 17.68 
50-54 
(m-f) on % f   2.2  12.3  7.7  24.1 
males  12.09 17.47 15.80 23.85 
females  10.19 15.08 12.66 17.81 
55-59 
(m-f)  on  %  f 15.7 13.7 13.5 25.3 
males  - - 15.27  24.24 
females  - - - 17.84 
60-64 
(m-f)  on  %  f  - - - 26.4 
males  9.85  12.17 11.85 19.59 
females  9.63  11.91 11.58 15.81 
Totaal 
(m-f)  on  %  f  2.2 2.1 2.3 19.3 
Source: CBS, Statline  
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Table 18  Wage scales in ABU collective labour agreement 2004-2009, per 08-08-2005 (€ gross per hour) 
Functional 
group 
Start salary  End salary 
1 7.89  9.98 
2 8.13  10.59 
3 8.43  11.30 
4 8.82  12.17 
5 9.22  13.12 
6 9.68  14.24 
7 10.25  15.46 
8 10.88  17.52 




Table  19 Distribution of gross hourly wages related to Statutory Minimum Wage (SMW) of Dutch temporary agency 
workers (code 74501), the Netherlands, December 2004 
  <=SMW  101-115 %  116-130 %  >130 %  Total  Empl (x 1,000*) 
male  7.4  17.0 17.4 58.2  100.0  125,2 
female  6.8  21.8 23.9 47.5  100.0  85,6 
total  7.2  19.0 18.0 55.8  100.0  210,8 
Source: CBS, Statline 
 
 
Table 20  Mean gross hourly wages (€) for temp agency workers, by industry, the Netherlands, 2000-2004 (2004 level) 
  no temp agency worker 
temp agency 
worker 
1  agriculture, manufacturing, building  14.24  10.27 
2  trade, transport, horeca  12.08  8.86 
3  commercial services  14.53  10.08 
4  public sector, health, education  15.37  10.23 
N 63,113  292 
Source:  WageIndicator survey, 2000-2004, unweighted dat 
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